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I. ARGUME NT
Summary judgments are decided based on whether the evidence is subject to different
inferences, interpretations, or conclusions. See

IDAHO

R. C!v. P. 56(c) (2015). That standard

should be uniformly applied by Idaho courts and it has been the aspirational standard for Idaho
courts since the notion of summary judgments was conceived. As the Court revievvs Silver
Creek's arguments, it should do so while always keeping the summary judgment standard at the
forefront. Silver Creek's arguments are all about its interpretations of the evidence: however,
those interpretations should be disregarded by this Court and should have been disregarded by
the district court below. Sunrain was the non-moving party and entitled to the benefit of all
favorable inferences from the evidence in the record on summary judgment and also on
reconsideration. Silver Creek obfuscates and repeatedly confuses the standard to be applied to
the evidence in the arguments contained in the Respondent Brief. Applying the simple, timehonored summary judgment standard to the appropriate issues and evidence, however, demands
reversal and vacating the judgment against Sunrain.
A. The summary judgment decision was not harmless error.
The district court's denial of Sunrain's motion to reconsider affirmed its prior grant of
partial summary judgment. The consequences of that ruling are obvious. The ruling resolved
certain critical aspects of Silver Creek's legal claims against Sunrain and precluded Sunrain from
even presenting evidence and argument to the jury on those specific issues. Silver Creek's
incredible suggestion that the district court's decision constituted harmless error lacks merit.
Unsurprisingly, Silver Creek employs evidence adduced at trial to argue that the district
court's decision constituted harmless error. This alternative universe of evidence created by
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Silver Creek constrncts

the frailest

facades suggestive

harmless error.

Creek consciously ignores the reality that the district court's decisions, both on partial summary
judgment and reconsideration, shaped the contours of how, and what, evidence could even be
admitted at trial. It is unfair and legally improper to argue that the district court did not err \Vhen
deciding issues based solely on evidence and a record not present at the time of the hearing.
It is axiomatic that an appellate court should reviev,r the propriety of a grant of partial
summary judgment based solely on the record existing at the time the motion is presented. See
Rayner Covering Sys., Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co., 589 N.E.2d I 034, 1036 (Ill. 1992);
Leonardv. 1vforan Foods, Inc., 343 P.3d 693, 700 (Or. 2015). Notwithstanding the obviousness of

this principle, Silver Creek supports its argument that the district court's decision was harmless
with references to the evidence admitted at trial. Summary judgment dispensed with requiring
Silver Creek to provide evidence of issues at trial. The district court's Order operated under the
auspices of Rule 56(d), which states:
Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion for Summary Judgment. If on motion under
this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually
and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
IDAHO

R. Crv. P. 56(d).
Because of the district court's sweeping rulings ignoring critical, contrary evidence while

improperly giving Silver Creek, the moving party on summary judgment, all favorable
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Sunrain could not present evidence contrary to the district court's findings as
articulated in its July 23, 2014 Order. (See R Vol. I, pp. 123-25.) That Order established certain
matters, both factual and legal, for purposes of the trial. (Id) The district court so severely
limited the evidence available to Sunrain at trial that Sunrain went to trial completely hamstrung
from a defense perspective. For Silver Creek to suggest that Sunrain failed to later present the
evidence previously excluded, is not merely a disingenuous argument in support of the
indefensible, it is an exercise in sophistry. While it should be fundamental that this Court should
not gauge the correctness of the district court's pre-trial orders based on the issues addressed at
trial, that is precisely \Vhat Silver Creek urges upon the Court. The pre-trial order instead should
be analyzed based solely upon the record before the district court at the time of the hearing.
There were many triable issues of fact before the district court on the essential issues of
whether the seed conformed to the Contract and whether Sunrain accepted the seed following the
discovery of BRR. These two issues were the fundamental underpinnings of the district court's
order granting partial summary judgment. There were disputed facts whether the seed provided
to Silver Creek by Sunrain was infected with BRR at the time it was delivered to Silver Creek. 1
For example, the Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA) certified the seed consistent with
the applicable standards at the time. (See, e.g., R Vol. I, p. 66-9; see also Trial Tr. pp. 319, 325,
454-57.) This included mnning tests for CMS or BRR. (Id) In March 2012, before Silver Creek
planted any of the seed that it received from Sunrain, ICIA performed tests on the seed and the

1

Sunrain, in an effort not to waive any issue m argument, will respond to the arguments advanced by Silver Creek
even though such a response will be predicated on evidence submitted at trial. Sunrain submits that the Court should
ignore Silver Creek's arguments in toto based upon the evidence at trial while considering this issue.
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tests came back with negative results for BRR. (Def.

AA.)2 Silver Creek did not submit an

expert affidavit in support of its motions. The relevant record contained no undisputed facts that
Sunrain 's production line was the source of the BRR.
What is troubling is that throughout the summary judgment hearing and on
reconsideration, the testimony relied upon by Silver Creek to '·establish" that Sunrain was the
source of the BRR was not developed until February 2015, more than seven months after the
initial summary judgment hearing- in other words, the district court simply accepted Silver
Creek's unsupported speculation that the seed provided by Sunrain in 2011 and 2012 was
infected with BRR. 3 In fact, the only evidence before the district court was that the crop showed
BRR cifter it had been planted, grown and harvested by Silver Creek in Silver Creek's fields
using Silver Creek's equipment. The evidence that was before the district comi related solely to a
different variety of seed potato grown on Ebe's farm in 2011, a year after Sunrain sold seed to
Silver Creek. (R Vol. I, p. 66-12.) This variety was not even involved in Sunrain's transaction
with Silver Creek. (Id.) Thus, contrary to Silver Creek's inaccurate statements in its briefing, the
issue of whether the seed was infected prior to arriving at Silver Creek's storage was far from
undisputed. There is no admissible evidence that the seed actually grown and delivered to Silver
Creek was ever on a farm infected with BRR at the time the seed was on the farm.

B. There were issues of fact whether Sunrain rejected the seed.
Silver Creek's arguments on appeal exhibit the same weaknesses that they possessed

2

This evidence, admitted at trial, should alone have been sufficient to vacate the partial summary judgment.
Sunrain's counsel objected to certain jury instructions on the basis of the evidence at trial. (Trial Tr.
Vol. I, pp.

40.)
3

This evidence was the Bragg deposition, taken on February 17, 2015. (Trial Tr. Vol I, p. 418.)
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839-

the district court, beginning with Silver Creek's complete failures to

the standard

of review for a summary judgment order and articulate even a single acceptable ground to affirm
the district court. This standard of review is quite simple and has been widely accepted and
followed by Idaho courts for decades. When the standard is applied to the proceedings that
addressed the matter of rejection, there is only one proper outcome: reversal. The summary
judgment record contained evidence which far exceeded a "mere scintilla of evidence" that
Sunrain unequivocally rejected the seed, that Sunrain did not later ratify or reinstate the Contract
following the rejection, that the seed tendered to Sunrain by Silver Creek did not comport with
the requirements of the Contract, and that there was no competent evidence that BRR existed in
the seed sold by Sunrain to Silver Creek that was grown out as the 2012 crop. Thus, the Court
should reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
The following evidence, though not exhaustive, was in the record at the summary
judgment stage and established triable issues of material fact:
•

Derbidge told Johnson (Silver Creek) that Sunrain rejected the seed on the phone
within a week oflearning of the non-conformity of the seed. (R Vol. I, pp. 13739.)

•

Derbidge told Johnson in person that Sunrain rejected the seed within a month of
learning about the BRR non-conformity. (Id.)

•

Davenport, Sunrain's president, told Johnson that Sunrain rejected the defective
seed in person within a month of discovering the defects. (Id., pp. 146-50.)

•

The seed was never certified following the rejection and neither Sunrain nor
Silver Creek made efforts to certify the seed. (Id., pp. 66-15 through 66-19.)
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•

Johnson told

he

G2s,

9,947.7

(cw1), were ineligible for recertification. (Id., p. 137.)
•

Sunrain took steps to cooperate and assist Silver Creek in clearing its storage
after the rejections occurred. (Id., p. 139, Dep. 23:2-9.)

•

The parties decided to sell the 2012 crop as cattle feed. (Id., p. 143.)

•

The removal of seed as cattle feed was done in coajunction with Silver Creek.

(Id.)
•

The parties agreed that the proceeds from the cattle feed sales would ultimately
be paid to Silver Creek. (Id.)

•

The seed was not released to Sunrain as part of the Contract, but as a result of
Sunrain's efforts to help Silver Creek clear its storage. (Id., p. 143.)

It was in the light of all of the foregoing evidence that the district court in one breath
commented that it viewed the evidence as being sufficient to "stand as evidence of rejection"
(Hr'g Tr., p. 110) and in the next breath inexplicably failed to follow the simple summary
judgment standard. The district court should have construed all of the foregoing evidence in a
light most favorable to Sunrain, which, at a minimum, generated triable issues of fact whether
Sunrain accepted or rejected the seed under the UCC.
The principles of law articulated by Silver Creek are not that controversial, nor are they
novel. Sunrain recognizes and, in fact, has previously cited to similar statements of the law
governing rejection of defective goods under the UCC. (See Appellant Br. § IV.A.2.) The cases
relied upon by Silver Creek for the conclusory arguments that Sumain failed to reject the seed,
however, are distinguishable on their facts.
10 Appellant Reply Brief

Borges v. )vfagic Valley

Inc., 616 P.2d 273 (Idaho 1980), was an

from

outcome of a jury trial. Id., at 274. The issue before the Court, therefore, was whether there was
substantial evidence supporting the outcome of the trial. Id., at 276. The Court found that at trial
there was conflicting evidence of rejection but that there was substantial evidence, i.e., sufficient
evidence, to affirm the jury's verdict concerning the issue ofrejection . Id. This is different than
the facts in this case. Here, the Court's review is constrained by the standard of review for a
summary judgment rnling. Unlike Borges, a jury never had the chance to decide because the
district court rnled, as a matter of law, that there had been no rejection notwithstanding the fact
that it had evidence that would stand for rejection. (Hr' g Tr., p. 110.) And though unilateral
resale of goods might be indicia of acceptance, it is certainly not conclusive or dispositive. In this
case, there \Vas no evidence that Sunrain unilaterally acted vis-a-vis the rejected seed. Instead,
the evidence, when taken together, indicated that the ultimate disposition of the rejected seed was
done in cooperation by both Sunrain and Silver Creek in an effort to mitigate the seed loss.
Beal v. Griffin, 849 P.2d 118 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993), is an appeal from the outcome of a

bench trial. Id. at 120. Thus, the Court of Appeal's rnling is not germane to the issues in this case.
The Court's focus in the Beal appeal was whether there was support in the evidence for the
judge's findings following the bench trial. Id. This is a profoundly different level of review than
when a Com1 reviews an order granting summary judgment. Review of summary judgment
entails scrutinizing the evidence submitted in connection with the summary judgment motion.
Further, on summary judgment, "[w]hen considering whether the evidence in the record shows
that there is no genuine issue of material fact the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and
draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non..'lloving party." Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l
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Ct!'., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816,819 (2002).

the evidence on summary

judgment was whether the evidence, taken as a whole, only supported the conclusion that
Sunrain accepted the tainted seed. As noted, supra, there was substantial evidence contrary to
Silver Creek's interpretation of that same evidence. Therefore, summary judgment should have
been denied to Silver Creek.
Afohr v. Shultz, 388 P.2d 1002 (Idaho 1964). is of no value because it predates the

enactment of the UCC.
Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 8455 P.2d 567 (Idaho Ct. Appl. 1992), is of limited assistance to

the Court. The Court of Appeals observes that an "action taken within a reasonable time is taken
'seasonably."' Id., at 575 (citing IDAHO Com~ ANN.§ 28-2-204(3).) In Figueroa, the evidence
was that Kit-San only told Figueroa that the "goods were non-conforming." Id., at 158. There
was no evidence that Kit-San communicated anything else to Figueroa. Id.
This case is different than Figueroa. Here, both Derbidge and Davenport testified that not
only did they tell Silver Creek that the seed was non-conforming, but also that Sunrain rejected
the seed. (See R Vol. L pp. 137, 139, 146-50.) Nothing could be more unequivocal under the
UCC than for a buyer to tell the seller that the the buyer "rejected" the goods. And yet, the
district court ignored the testimony by Sunrain's representatives, contrary to the governing legal
precedents. See

IDAHO

R. C!v. P. 56(c); see also Wicke! v. Chamberlain, 363 P.3d 854, 857

(Idaho 2015) (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l iifed. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816,
819 (2002); Arregui v. Gallegos-J\lain. 153 Idaho 801,804,2 91 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012)).
Whether a rejection was unequivocal is a fact question and an issue a jury should have decided,
as noted in prior briefing. 4 Anderson U.C.C. § 2-602:9 (3d. ed.); ICS1Executone Telecom. Inc. v.
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Parts Warehouse, Inc., 171 A.D.2d 1066, 569 N .Y.S

42, 43 (1991 ); Afarmi

Graniti D'Italia Sicilmarmi Sp.A. v. Universal Granite and 1vfarble, 757 F.Supp.2d 773, 72

U.C.C.Rep.Serv.2d 1158 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (applying Illinois law). Thus, the district comi erred.
Once the BRR was discovered, Sunrain rejected all of the remaining lots of seed that
Silver Creek had not delivered to Sunrain. (See R Vol. I, pp. 137, 139, 146-50.) In an effort to
cooperatively clear Silver Creek's storage, while never rescinding the rejection of the seed,
Sunrain assisted Silver Creek in shipping the seed to cattle feed. (Id., p. 143.) The evidence in the
record before the district court supported that position and should have been construed in
Sunrain's favor. Such an interpretation of the evidence should have resulted in vacating the
partial summary judgment.
Silver Creek suggests that Sunrain's conduct vis-a-vis the cattle feed shipments
constitutes acceptance of the nonconforming seed, thereby obligating Sunrain to pay the contract
rate for the seed. (Respondent Br. p. 20.) Silver Creek observes that Sunrain "exercised dominion
over the Remaining Potatoes" and that was an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the
seed. (Id.) The evidence does not solely support that conclusion; rather, the evidence is subject to
conflicting interpretation and inferences under Rule 56( c). For example, the same evidence that
suggests, according to Silver Creek, that Sunrain exercised dominion over the "Remaining
Potatoes" may also be construed to support Sunrain's position that the seed was rejected within a
reasonable time and that the parties reached a superseding agreement about how to deal with the
rejected seed. (See R Vol. I, pp. I37, 139, 146-50.) Following Sunrain's rejection, both parties
sent seed to cattle feed in conjunction with the other. (R Vol. II, pp. 361-369.) Contrary to Silver
Creek's representations to the Court that "Sunrain retained the sale proceeds" from the cattle feed
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suggesting that Sunrain retained all of money, Silver Creek actually sold seed to cattle feed
and retained the money it received from those sales. (Id., p. 364.) Unlike Silver Creek, Sunrain
held its portion of the cattle feed proceeds "for the benefit of Silver Creek," though Silver Creek
never accepted the money. (Id., p. 328,, 20.) The joint effort to dispose of the seed is consistent
with the UCC and Sunrain's rejection theory. See IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 28-2-603(1 ).
Silver Creek relies on case law from other jurisdictions that are distinguishable on their
facts. Eagle Afanufacturing Co. v. Arkell & Douglas, 197 A.O. 788 (N. Y.S. 1921 ), does not
involve the UCC. It also does not involve a situation where the goods tendered \Vere
nonconforming and were rejected, with the parties subsequently cooperating to mitigate damages
and resolve the situation. Id. at 791. In that case, the defendants took possession of the goods and
resold them to third parties without any further involvement of the plaintiff. Id. That did not
happen here. The impertinence of the fact cannot be overstated.

Connecticut Investment Casing Corp. v. Afade-Rite Tool Co .. Inc., 416 N.E.2d 966 (Mass.
1981), is also distinguishable. In that case, there was no evidence that Made-Rite ever notified
the other party it rejected the defective goods. Id. at 969. The conversations between Made-Rite
and the other party consisted of Made-Rite pressing the party ''to deliver" goods. Id. Made-Rite
also returned only a sm2,ll portion of the goods to the other party and the other party cured the
defects by reworking and redelivering the latches. Id. This is different because the evidence was
that Sunrain clearly rejected the seed after the discovery of CMS.

Franklin v. Augusta Dodge, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. 2007), is a case involving
revocation of acceptance rather than formal rejection of defective goods. Id. at 864. In Franklin,
Franklin purchased a truck, tried to return it, kept the truck, paid insurance on the truck,
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maintained the tmck, and drove

truck. Id. He claimed

revoked his acceptance the

tmck. Id. at 864-65. His retention of the truck after the alleged revocation of acceptance vitiated
whatever effect his prior revocation might have had. As stated, the facts here are different
because Sunrain never repossessed the seed or did anything unilaterally with the seed; instead,
Sunrain did everything in concert with Silver Creek, i.e., coordinated the shipments.
Toshiba 1\;fachine Co. v. SPM Flow Control, lnc., 180 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. 2005), stands for

the proposition that continued use of goods "undoes a purported rejection or revocation of
acceptance." Id. at 772. However, "[ w )hat constitutes reasonable use is a question of fact to be
decided under the circumstances of each case ... [.]"Id. Just because a party may be involved in
using the goods does not equate to acceptance. Id. at 773. The degree of economic hardship the
buyer may suffer if it discontinued use of the defective goods is also relevant to the
reasonableness of the use. Id. In short, just because a buyer helps a seller take actions to mitigate
the seller's losses that does not equate to acceptance of defective goods as a matter of law.
Hawke Distributing, Inc. v. Nuevo Sol Partners. Inc., 689 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1997),

involved a purchaser who retained 390 video disc players and then the purchaser unilaterally
shipped them over seas for resale to a third party purchaser. Id. The unilateral action, and actual
physical possession/retention of the goods, resulted in the court finding that the purchaser's
conduct constituted acceptance. Id. This case is different than Hawke Distributing. Here, there
was never physical possession of the seed being sent to cattle feed. The shipment to cattle feed
\Vas done in conjunction with Silver Creek (some actually by Silver Creek) and was not a
unilateral act by S unrain.
Fiat Auto USA., Inc., v. Hollums, 363 S.E.2d 312 (Ga. 1987), is another ease of
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revocation of acceptance. Id. at 314. In that case, the purchaser, Hollums, sent a letter to a dealer
revoking his acceptance of a car. Id. After doing so, Hollums went to the lot, removed the car,
took it for repairs, painted the car, paid taxes on the car, attempted to sell the car, and drove it
over 6,000 miles. Id. at 315. This is unlike the facts before the district court here.
The evidence before the district court during summary judgment was subject to different
interpretations. The standard of review that the district court should have applied to the evidence
should have resulted in the partial summary judgment being vacated and then a full trial on the
merits of all issues. The district court failed to perform its essential function of reviewing the
facts in a light most favorable to Sunrain. This Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
C. The Swenson affidavit does not establish ratification as a matter of law.

The second Swenson affidavit does not establish ratification. Nor does the affidavit
establish that the payment Subrain made to in May 2013 abrogated the prior rejection of the
seed. Derbidge clearly explained the purpose of the $175,000 payment to Silver Creek in his
deposition. (R Vol. I, p. 137; see also R Vol. II, pp. 366-67.) Sunrain did not intend to reinstate
the Contract by virtue of the payment, nor did the payment signify that Sunrain was willing to
perform the Contract notwithstanding the fact that Silver Creek had breached its contractual
obligation to provide Sunrain with certified seed. Swenson's affidavit only states that for
purposes of Sunrain's internal tracking of the payments, she suggested an allocation among the
varieties. (R Vol. II, pp. 334-37.) In fact, Silver Creek fails to recognize the clear annotation
contained on Swenson's spreadsheet concerning the allocations of the payments to the different
varieties that had been rejected. (Id., p. 337.) She clearly identifies the conditional allocation of
the $175,000 payment to the varieties as a "rough guess on how this might be considered spread
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the varieties?????" (Id) Her allocation was not intended to be definitive and was,
moreover, a pure accounting function. There is no evidence that Swenson had authority to bind
Sunrain to her allocation or Silver Creek even knew about the allocation during 2013. The record
contained no evidence that the allocation constituted a "final" allocation of the payment among
the different varieties. Similarly, the relevant record does not contain any evidence that
Davenport or Derbidge approved of the proposed allocation and then informed Silver Creek
about the internal allocation. 4 The $175,000 \Vas paid in response to the invoice being sent by
Silver Creek because it was apparent to Sunrain that Silver Creek needed cash flow assistance.
(R Vol. IL pp. 366-67.)
The payment could not have functioned as a ratification or reinstatement of the Contract.
Under Rule 56(c) and the summary judgment standard, the district court should not have
concluded that Sunrain ratified the Contract as a matter of law because there vvere different
inferences and interpretations of the $175,000 payment that were reasonable. '·Summary
judgment is improper 'if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." ' Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149
Idaho 881,890,2 43 P.3d 1069, 1078 (2010) (citing McPheters v. J\;faile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64
P.3d 317, 320 (2003)).
Here, there are different evidentiary conclusions that could have been drawn about the
$175,000 payment to Silver Creek. Ajury could reasonably have taken Derbidge at his word
concerning the purpose and intent behind the payment. A jury could have concluded that the

4

At trial, Swenson clearly testified that she prepared the spreadsheet to summarize the financial consequences of the
Silver Creek situation to Sunrain's board members. It was solely an internal document. (Trial Tr., p. 705.)
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$175,000 was based on a separate deal between the parties. A jury could have decided the
allocation was merely an internal booking allocation for Sunrain's own purposes. The jury could
have decided that since Silver Creek never saw the spreadsheet in 2013, Sunrain could not have
ratified anything because it was never communicated to Silver Creek. As the judges of the facts,
the jury should have been afforded the opportunity to decide the issues.

D. The district court erred by not requiring proof of conformance with the
Contract.
Silver Creek failed to present evidence that the seed it grew conformed to the Contract in
2013. There was no evidence of sorting and no evidence of conformance with the Contract's size
requirements (R Vol. I, p. 66-17.); no evidence of yields per acre with regard to pricing (id.); no
evidence of conformance with the Sunrain/Potandon/Solanum Seed Grower Protocol (id.); and,
importantly, no evidence that the seed grown by Silver Creek was actually certified by ICIA, as
required by the Contract. (Id.)
Silver Creek concedes that it was required by the Contract to grow "certified seed
potatoes ... for use in commercial planting." (Respondent Br. at 13, emphasis in original.) Silver
Creek tries to play a game of semantics with the term recertifiable. (Id.) Yet the Contract clearly
states that Sunrain's purpose entering into the Contract was to procure a source of seed that was
actually certified by ICIA. (R Vol. I, pp. 66-15 through 66-19.) Seed potatoes can be certifiable,
but if the seed is not submitted to the certification process and ultimately certified, it cannot be
called certified seed. The Contract in this case explicitly mandated Silver Creek grow and
produce certified seed for Sunrain. (Id.) It did not state that Silver Creek only needed to grow
"certifiable" seed. (Id.) Silver Creek held itself out as a business that provides seed that is
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actually certified by ICIA. (Id.)

suggest that Silver Creek had any obligation other than to

provide Sunrain with ICIA certified seed is inconsistent with the Contract's terms.
The Contract required Silver Creek to provide Sunrain with "proof of said potatoes
passing all certification and field inspections, due at the time of delivery or after final
inspections." (Id., p. 66-17, emphasis added.) This never happened. Silver Creek never got the
seed certified, notwithstanding its arguments that the seed was certifiable and that some of it
passed the tests required by ICIA. The vehement arguments posited by Silver Creek are
unavailing because the mere fact that the seed could have been certified is immaterial. Eligibility
for certification is not actual certification. Silver Creek's arguments are based on an obvious
misreading of the plain terms of Section 4 of the Contract and have no bearing on the issue of
whether there were issues of fact as to Silver Creek's complying with the Contract. 5
Silver Creek breached the Contract by not providing Sunrain with certified seed. Silver
Creek breached express warranties and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. Silver Creek's breaches of contract and warranties impaired the value of the
whole Contract. There were triable issues of fact supporting all of Sunrain' s arguments on partial
summary judgment and reconsideration. As articulated in the Appellant Brief, the district court
ignored the evidence that Sunrain presented to the district court and this Court should reverse.

5
lmportantiy, there is no evidence that after Silver Creek sent the seed lots of additional testing and the results were
negative for BRR, Sunrain ever insisted that the seed be certified and that the cattle feed shipments cease.
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E. The district court erred when it excluded evidence about ICIA certification tags,
including evidence concerning disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies.
During discovery, Silver Creek saw an example of a blue tag during Johnson's
deposition. It was Exhibit 6 to the deposition. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 305.)6 During his deposition,
and at trial, Johnson recognized the tag and acknoii:ledged that every load of certified seed that
he shipped had to have a blue tag attached. (Id., p. 324.) Moreover, the district court admitted
the front side of the blue tag (Def. Ex. Y(l)), but withheld the backside of the document (Ex.
Y(2). To hold that there was foundation for the front of the tag but not the back of the tag is
perplexing and legally irreconcilable. Either there is foundation for a document or there is no
foundation. The document cannot be divided in the manner performed by the district court.
Silver Creek argues that there was no evidence that the tags were a part of the parties'
agreement. (Respondent Br. 26.) That fact, however, was plainly in dispute. During an offer of
proo( Derbidge testified that the tags were a part of every arrangement that Sunrain made with
its buyers. (Id., pp. 652-72.) There was evidence supporting a finding that the seed Silver Creek
received was, in fact, tagged after completion of the winter grow-out. (Trial Tr., pp. 319, 324,
453-58, 535, 682.)
Silver Creek premises its arguments on the fact that there was no evidence that Johnson
signed the tags. However, that is not the legal standard for the tags to apply to a transaction.
There is no evidentiary requirement that the tags be signed by a party to the transaction before
the tags are a part of the transaction. The Court dealt with the issue in Duffin v. Idaho Crop
Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 895 P.2d 1195 (1995). The UCC provides that

6

The deposition was published during trial.
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implied warranties may be disclaimed through course of dealing, course of performance, or
usage of trade. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-316(3 )( c). The tags can effectuate a disclaimer if the
parties to the transaction are familiar with the tags or the certification rules, or if the parties had
used the tags prior to the transaction. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1012, 895 P.2d at 1205. Thus, Silver
Creek's suggestion that the absence of Johnson's signature created a problem with the
evidentiary foundation of the tag is incorrect as a matter oflaw. The issue is not whether Silver
Creek signed the tags; instead, the issue at trial was whether there was adequate evidence before
the district court establishing Silver Creek's prior use of the tags, familiarity with the tags, and
familiarity with the certification rules. There was unquestionably significant evidence of all of
the foregoing.
Silver Creek spends an inordinate amount of time arguing that the Contract could not be
altered or modified without a signed writing by the parties. The issue is when did the v,:arranties
apply to the transaction between Silver Creek and Sunrain. The tags were given to Silver Creek
after the winter-grow out and in conjunction with the sale of the seed by Sunrain to Silver Creek.
(Trial Tr., pp. 319,324, 453-58, 535, 682.) The Contract applied to the sale of the seed from
Silver Creek to Sunrain. (Def. Ex. 5; see also R Vol. I, pp. 66-15 through 66-19.) That Contract
was clearly modified by the parties and there are '·writings'' to that effect. (See Def. Ex. 0.)
Moreover, even the common law clearly allows for tags to become a part of the transaction, since
they were accepted by the parties as a condition precedent to the transaction.
The tags' disclaimers and limitations of remedies applied when Sunrain sold the seed to
Silver Creek to grow the next generation of the seed. Sunrain was the seller and Silver Creek was
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buyer in that transaction. The tags were delivered after the winter-grow out (Trial Tr., pp.
319, 324, 453-58, 535, 682.) Johnson never disputed receiving the tags.
The district court had the necessary foundation before it to admit Defendant's Exhibit
Y(2) in its entirety. Johnson testified that he used the tags on his own seed. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp.
324, 584, 589-90.) Sunrain testified that it used the tags in general and specifically with respect
to this seed. (Id., pp. 652-72.) The law requires the certification, i.e., tagging, of seed loads or
totes.

IDAHO CODE

ANN. § 22-502. Johnson testified about his familiarity with the certification

rules when he said that every single truck of certified seed had to have a tag. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.
5 85.) Johnson acknowledged that the tags constituted "representations that [he made] to the
buyer" of his seed. (Id., p. 591.) Johnson's testimony laid foundation for common use in the
industry, course of performance, and course of dealing. Johnson's testimony certainly established
Silver Creek's familiarity with the tags, the certification rules, and prior use.
Therefore, all of the evidence required by the D14fin court existed during trial of this
matter. The district court affirmatively chose to ignore the law, as stated in Diifjin, and the
testimony before it. The district court's decision constituted clear error and an abuse of its
discretion as the trial's evidentiary gatekeeper. Whether the tags became a part of the parties·
transaction was a fact issue per Duffin Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1011-12, 895 P.2d 1204-05. Sunrain
expressly identified the Dujfzn holding to the district court. (Trial Tr., pp. 599-661, 790-804.)
The jury should have been allowed to decide the issue and the district court erred by excluding
Exhibit Y(2) and the testimony concerning the disclaimer that Sunrain put into the record. (Id.,
pp. 652-72.) The district court's observation that there was sufficient foundation in the record for
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admitting the tags, and its concomitant failure to admit the tags, constitutes an abuse of
discretion. (See id., p. 671, 11. 11-15.) The Court should reverse and order a new trial.
F. The blue tags limit warranties, including remedies, even as to latent defects.
Ultimately, Silver Creek takes the position, willingly adopted by the district court, that it
holds a privileged status allowing it to simply ignore the legal effect of integral regulatory and
statutory requirements placed on all seed potato growers in Idaho that explicitly limit warranties
and remedies as a matter of simply engaging in the growing and transport ofseed potatoes.
irrespective of vvhether defects are patent or latent. The \Varranty limitation found in Exhibit Y (2)
does not contain any restrictions as to its application. The warranty limitation absolutely and
unambiguously limits remedies to the purchase price of the seed. In fact, Y(2) expressly states
that the limitation applies to "all events" and not just non-latent defects. (See Ex. Y(2).)
The tags' genesis is Idaho's Seed Potato Act of 1996 where the legislature clearly stated:
The department is hereby authorized to promulgate rules that may be necessary for the
efficient enforcement of the provisions of this chapter including, but not limited to,
requirements for planting, testing, sampling, inspection, and compliance verification
procedures. The department may by rules, establish a schedule of fees for services
performed by the department in the administration of the rules.
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 22-505. 7 The department developed rules and delegated the authority to
govern the sale of certified seed to the Idaho Crop Improvement Association. Dz~fjin, 126 Idaho
at l 004-05, 895 P.2d at 1197-98. Thus, unlike the case of Noma Agrolndustrial Sa De CV v. Enza
Zaden North America, 492 F.Supp. 2d 1175 (D. Ariz. 2007), this is not a situation where one
party drafted the limitation of remedies provision. Instead, this provision was created pursuant to
statutory authority granted by the legislature. The facts do not involve a party overreaching in
7

The Department of Agriculture. Idaho Code Ann. § 22-50 l ( l ).
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terms of its contractual bargaining power. Sellers of all certified seed enjoy the benefit and
protection of the tag's limitation of warranty, including Silver Creek when selling its ovm
certified seed. (See Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 324, 584, 589-90.) Moreover, in Noma Agroindustrial Sa
De CV, there was an Arizona statute providing that "[w]here circumstance cause an exclusive or

limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose ... ", it can be invalidated. Id. at 1181. Silver Creek
points this Court to no comparable Idaho statute.
Latimer v. William A1ueller & Son. Inc., 386 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. 1986), relied upon a

Michigan statute to find that a tag disclaiming warranties and limiting remedies on bags of beans
was not conspicuous and was an unconscionable attempt to limit remedies. Id., at 625.
Additionally, there was no evidence of trade usage of the tag in Latimer, unlike this case, where
every load of certified seed has a tag.

IDAHO Com: ANN.§

22-502.

Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657 (S.D. 1988), Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948

F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991), and Afallis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 505 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1998),
review decisions by the respective district courts that contract limitations of remedy were
unconscionable based on the facts and circumstances of the respective cases. However, in this
case, the district court never considered unconscionability and Silver Creek raises it for the first
time on appeal. "To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by
the court belmv or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.'' kfcPheters v. A1aile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003)
(citing Whittedv. Canyon County Ed ofComm'rs ., 137Idaho 118, 121-22,44 P.3d 1173, 117677 (2002)). Thus, the Court should disregard all of Silver Creek's arguments that the tags'
remedy limitations fail of their essential purpose.
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G. The district court erred by admittin g hearsay testimony by Jeff Bragg.

If a witness lacks personal knowledge of an event, then that individual lacks foundatio n
to testify concerning what happened.

IDAHO

R. Evm. 602 (2015). Counsel's questions to Bragg

during his deposition required Bragg to rely on hearsay to answer the questions. Bragg lacked
foundation to respond and to the extent that he was able to answer he relied on hearsay.
Silver Creek makes the time-worn assertion that the testimony from Bragg about what
Ebe told him "was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted." (Respondent Br. p. 35.) Yet,
there was absolutely no other purpose for the testimony 8-it \Vas the 1inch pin of Silver Creek's
entire case because it was the only "evidence" linking Sunrain with a grower demostrating BRR.
Ebe's hearsay statements to Bragg that Ebe had BRR on his farm provided Silver Creek a
smoking gun to sell to the jury. Once the inadmissible statement was in, Silver Creek's counsel
let obfuscation of the time line and pseudoscience presented by its expert gloss over the fact that
the BRR discovery on Ebe Farms occurred a year after Silver Creek grew the seed. (Trial Tr.
Vol. I, p. 852.)9
Silver Creek elicited testimony from Bragg that Ebe told him about BRR on Ebe's farm.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 501-03.) The elicitation of the testimony was to establish that Sunrain knew
about the BRR, failed to tell Silver Creek about the BRR, and that there was BRR on Ebe's Farm
and in Sunrain's production chain. (Id.) Thus, the admission of the hearsay testimony was not
harmless error. There was no other alternative evidence of establishing when Sunrain learned

8

Nor does Silver Creek ever reveal what other purpose the proffered hearsay served.
Assuming, arguendo, that Ebe's statement was admissible, the evidence presented by Silver Creek, including
the
imprecise speculation of Silver Creek's expert, there still remains the question of whether this"eviden
ce" meets the
requisite quantum of scientific reliability to establish causation.
9
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about the BRR on Ebe's farm. Silver Creek argued, with no basis whatsoever, during closings
that Sunrain knew about the BRR in 2012 and that no one from Sunrain told Silver Creek about
Ebe Farms having a positive BRR test somewhere on its farm. (Id., p. 854.) Bragg's testimony
was the sole source of that information because Ebe informed Bragg, his contact at Sunrain. No
other individual had foundation to testify about when Sunrain first learned about the BRR. Thus,
the district court's admission of the hearsay was prejudicial and requires a new trial.

H. The district court erred in the manner it instructed the jury.
1. The district court erred by issuing Instruction Nos. 7-9, 19.

Jury Instruction No. 8 relates information to the jury that is entirely predicated on the
prior partial summary judgment ruling. (R Vol. III, p. 573.) It informs the jury that Sunrain is
obligated to pay the contract rate to Silver Creek for the seed that it accepted. (Id.) It then
confusingly informs the jury that there is a dispute whether Sunrain must pay for the potatoes
that did test positive for BRR. (Id.) It is an erroneous jury instruction because it informed the
jury that there was a contract between the parties obligating Sunrain to pay the full contract rate
to Silver Creek for the potatoes that the district court previously ruled were accepted, i.e., not
rejected, by Sunrain. On the whole, the instruction was erroneous because it contained
information from the incorrect partial summary judgment ruling.

2. The district court should have instructed the jury on modification.
There was evidence of modification of the Contract in writing. As noted in prior briefing,
there were vvTitten messages exchanged between Johnson and Derbidge that evidenced a
modification of the parties' agreement. The messages discussed the selling and shipping of the
seed to cattle feed. (See Def. Ex. 0.) Taken as a whole, the messages constituted a modificatio n
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of the Contract insofar as the seed was being delivered to cattle feed and that the terms of the
Contract no longer applied to the subject seed.
Moreover, the tags were arguably written modifications to the Contract that became a
part of the agreement as articulated, supra.
3. The district court erred when it instructed the jury on latent defects.

The district court should not have instmcted the jury on latent defects. Sunrain objected
to Instruction No. 12. (Trial Tr., p. 840.) Instruction No. 12 states, "Implied \Varranties may arise
and apply to goods with latent defects. A latent defect is a defect that lies dormant in the goods
until it manifests itself sometime after delivery." (R Vol. III, p. 577.)
There was no evidence that the BRR was present in the seed at the time of sale in 2012.
The evidence establish the contrary position, i.e., that the BRR tests were negative in March
2012. (Def. Ex. AA.) Dr. Gudmestad's testimony that the disease could be latent for a number of
years does not rise to the level of being evidence that there actually was latent CMS in the seed
when Sunrain sold it to Silver Creek in 2012. The only actual evidence of whether CMS vvas
present in the seed was the negative test results presented in Defendan f s Exhibit AA. Thus, the
instruction was erroneous.

I. The district court erred in awarding prejudgm ent interest to Silver Cr~ek.
1. Prejudgm ent interest should not have been awarded.

It is interesting that though both parties shipped seed to cattle feed, Silver Creek sought
and received interest based on the seed values identified in the original Contract. Yet there \Vas
evidence that the parties modified the Contract and mutually agreed to send the seed to cattle
feed. In fact, Silver Creek sent seed to cattle feed and retained the benefits of the proceeds from
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those sales. (R Vol. II, p. 364.) There is no basis, therefore, to award prejudgment interest on the
basis of the modified Contract.
There was no way to fix or know the exact amount owed, if any, to Silver Creek until
after trial. Though the Contract provided clear rates to be paid for

C\\-1

of seed, there \Vas little to

no evidence of yield per acre, conformance with growing standards, and other requirements that
would have entitled Silver Creek to be paid under the Contract. The jury could have reduced the
amount of money requested by Silver Creek by up to twenty percent, since the evidence at trial
suggested that a seed potato pile could shrink up to approximately twenty percent. (Trial Tr., pp.
330, 343.) The fact that the jury could not know, and therefore neither could the parties, what
amount of seed conformed to the Contract until after the trial militates against a pre-judgment
interest award.

2. Silver Creek is not entitled to interest on warranty theories.
Silver Creek does not respond to Sunrain's arguments that it was not entitled to interest
on the portion of its recovery based on the warranty theories. Silver Creek makes only a
perfunctory reference to the arguments and responds that Idaho courts have awarded
prejudgment interest in warranty cases. However, Silver Creek's dismissive arguments miss the
entire point of Sunrain' s argument that in warranty cases juries have to exercise discretion in
adjudicating the claims and also determine the reasonableness of a party's actions. Lackawann a
Leather Co. v. }vfartin & Stev,:art, Ltd., 730 F .2d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1984 ). The exercise of

discretion and the determination of the reasonableness of a party's action undercuts Silver
Creek's argument that the amount was liquidated until after trial. Thus, no prejudgment interest
should have been awarded to Silver Creek based on its recovery under warranty theories.
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3. The district court erred by not awarding Sunrain interest.
Similarly, Silver Creek does not dispute Sunrain's entitlement to interest on its offset
amount of $62,879.20. At no point does Silver Creek argue or cite any authority defending the
district court's decision to deny Sunrain interest on its counterclaim.

J. The district court erred in awarding Silver Creek its attorney fees and costs.
There was no overall prevailing party. Silver Creek ineffectively minimizes Sunrain's
victory on its counterclaim, as did the district court. The fact that Sunrain prevailed on the
primary claim against Silver Creek militates against a finding that Silver Creek was the overall
prevailing party. No one disputes whether Silver Creek received a judgment in the case:
hmvever, when viewed from an overall perspective, the parties each received relief relative to the
claims brought. 10 Sunrain prevailed on its counterclaim to recover amounts owed for seed sold
after the dispute over the CMS/BRR seed has arisen. Sunrain should have received a judgment
for $62,879.70, plus 18 percent interest, from the district court. Silver Creek never really
disputed the counterclaim, but required Sunrain to prosecute the claim through trial.
The outcome militates against the finding that Silver Creek prevailed overall. See Oake,,
P LLC, 152 Idaho at 546, 272 P.3d at 518. The fact that Silver Creek acquired the larger

judgment does not inherently make Silver Creek the overall prevailing party.
Sunrain recognizes Rule 54(e)(4) and the interpretation of that rule by the Court in
Eighteen Ante Ranch, LLC. However, as noted in prior briefing, the issue is simply that Silver

Creek voluntarily elected to self-limit its recourse to only reasonable attorney fees arising under
§ 12-120(3) of the Idaho Code. (R Vol. I, p. 19.) Though Silver Creek states that it sought fees
10

Though Silver Creek's relief was premised on an erroneously granted partial summary judgment ruling that
abrogated Sunrain's ability to defend the thrust of Siiver Creek's case.
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pursuant to "Idaho law", it limited

remedies to the statute and not the contract. (Id.) It never

placed any party on notice that it would subsequently seek fees based on the Contract until it
filed its fee motion. Additionally, Rule 54(e)(4) speaks only to a party asserting a "claim for
attorney fees" in any pleading.

IDAHO

R. CIV. P. 54(e)(4). Rule 8(a)(l) sets forth general rules of

pleading, including "Claims for Relief." Id. 8(a)(l). Rule 8(e)(2) states that claims may be made
in the alternative. Id. 8(e)(2). In other words, there is no requirement that the parties make an
affirmative, separate claim for attorney fees as a count in a pleading. However. there is a
requirement for notice pleading in Idaho. Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 807, 229
P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010). A party must state their claim for relief with some particularity. Id.
Here. Silver Creek never used any sort of particularity, even under the most generous notice
pleading standard, of the claim for fees under the contract. By identifying only the statute, Silver
Creek should not have been permitted to later rely on the Contract for its attorney fee claim. 11
Silver Creek misrepresents Sunrain · s argument before the district court. Silver Creek
argues that Sunrain did not raise the issue below. (Respondent Br. p. 46.) This is incorrect. (Hr'g
Tr., 19:5, 11, 14; 20:7. 20; 31:9, 13.) The issue ofunconsci onability was specifically raised by
Sunrain's counsel during the hearing. (Id.) Yet, whether Silver Creek actually paid the fees to its
counsel is not really relevant to the issue of uncomcionability. The district court observed that
the fees actually paid far exceeded what would have been a reasonable fee under Rule 54. (R

11

Sunrain notes that the attorney fee provision only applies to litigation brought in Bonneville County, Idaho. (R
Vol. I, p. 24.) This action was brought and tried in Blaine County, Idaho. Therefore, the contractual provision does
not apply.
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IV, p. 790.) The Court should vacate the district court's order awarding the fees
and costs to
Silver Creek and remand with instructions to only award reasonable fees and
costs. 12

K. Silver Creek is not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Silver Creek should not be awarded its attorney fees and costs on appeal. Silver
Creek
was not the overall prevailing party in the underlying litigation before the district
court. Attorn ey
fees are only awardable, at least under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), to the overall
prevailing party.
Eighteen ADie Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excava ting & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716,
721, 117 P.3d 130,

135 (2005). To the extent that the Court determines that there is no overall prevail
ing party, then
neither the Contract attorney fee provision nor Idaho Code § 12-120(3) affords
Silver Creek any
statutory basis for an attorney fee award.

II. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
As a result of the foregoing, the district court should be reversed and the matter
remanded.

ndet
t. Clair Gaffney PA
or the Defendant/Appellant

12

This should occur only to the extent that the district court is affirmed in its finding
that Silver Creek is entitled to
fees as the overall prevailing party in a commercial transaction lawsuit. If the
Court vacates the district court's ruling
that Silver Creek prevailed overall. then no fees should be awarded on remand.
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